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In Graham v. Florida, the Supreme Court struck down a 
severe prison sentence under the Eighth Amendment—
something it has only done once before, in Solem v. Helm, 
back in 1983.1 Moreover, the language and approach of 
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion carries the potential for 
further expansion and clarification of Eighth Amendment 
protections. That’s good news for those of us who view 
post-1983 decisions upholding severe prison sentences as 
an abdication of the Court’s constitutional responsibility 
to protect politically powerless criminal defendants from 
excessive penalties.2 At a minimum, Kennedy’s opinion 
suggests a more unified approach to proportionality 
review, in place of the Court’s previous two-track distinc-
tion between death and prison sentences.3
The bad news is that the Court’s decision could wind 
up being a very narrow precedent—the proverbial ticket 
good for this day and this train only—and one that doesn’t 
actually shorten many prison terms. The further bad news 
is that the majority in Graham may have managed to make 
Eighth Amendment law even less clear than it was before 
(the Court itself has noted that “our precedents in this 
area . . . have not established a clear or consistent path for 
courts to follow”4). Justice Kennedy purports to recognize 
two types of Eighth Amendment precedent: categorical bans 
(previously applied only in death-penalty cases) and case-
specific assessments (previously the only type of analysis 
applied to lengthy prison sentences). He then applies the 
death penalty approach to Graham’s prison sentence. But 
these two approaches are not as distinct as the Court seems 
to think; lower courts will now have to decide which one to 
use, and whether the choice really makes much difference. 
Moreover, the majority opinion and Justice Roberts’s 
concurrence continued to apply a standard of “gross  
disproportionality” without saying what that means—dis-
proportionate relative to what?5 In particular, is retributive 
disproportionality ever a sufficient basis to invalidate a 
prison sentence, or even a death sentence? If not—if 
unconstitutionally severe prison sentences must also be 
grossly disproportionate relative to all applicable non-
retributive sentencing purposes (mainly deterrence, 
incapacitation, and rehabilitation)—how is such non-
retributive proportionality defined? The Court’s silence  
on these matters gives lower courts very little guidance, 
and will result in either widely conflicting applications of 
Graham or (more likely) a refusal to take the Court’s deci-
sion seriously and give it any further application beyond 
its specific facts. 
i. The Good News
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion suggests that at least 
five justices are now willing to adopt meaningful Eighth 
Amendment limits on severe prison sentences, and to do 
so under categoric prohibitions such as those previously 
applied only to death sentences. Kennedy’s opinion also sheds 
further light on what factors enter into a finding of Eighth 
Amendment disproportionality. (Justice Roberts rejects 
the majority’s categoric rule, and his case-specific analysis 
may limit his condemnation of juvenile life without parole 
(LWOP) to the particular, rather extreme facts of Graham,6 
but his concurrence at least shows some willingness to 
use the Solem standards to limit extreme prison sentences 
under the Eighth Amendment, as well as a rejection of the 
hands-off approach of Justices Scalia and Thomas.) 
a. death isn’t So different
The Court’s prior case law, invalidating many more death 
sentences than prison terms and often (but not always) 
applying categoric, bright-line prohibitions, suggested that 
for Eighth Amendment purposes, “death is different.”7 
The majority opinion in Graham seems to partially erase 
that distinction, and to permit more generous Eighth 
Amendment review of severe prison sentences—at least  
if enough other things about the case are different. In prior 
cases, the Court had held that juvenile offenders are differ-
ent from adults, and thus can never receive the death 
penalty.8 The Court had also held that nonhomicide crimes 
are different (i.e., death is different on the offense side), so 
such offenders can never receive the death penalty.9 What 
the majority arguably held in Graham is that the latter two 
“differents” (juvenile offender, nonhomicide crime) out-
weigh the first, and allow more generous Eighth Amendment 
scrutiny even for a nondeath sentence. 
B. disproportionality Relative to What
In discussing why juveniles and nonhomicide crimes are 
different, the majority opinion gives strong emphasis to 
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the two sentencing factors normally associated with retrib-
utive punishment philosophy, the offender’s personal 
culpability10 and the seriousness of the harm caused or 
threatened by the offense.11 Although the Court also dis-
cusses whether Graham’s crime could be justified to 
achieve nonretributive sentencing purposes, its emphasis 
on culpability and harm suggests that in a future case 
retributive disproportionality might, by itself, be a basis 
for finding a prison sentence to be in violation of the 
Eighth Amendment.12
Such a purely retributive cap on punishment severity 
has been advocated by a number of scholars,13 and was 
apparently adopted in at least one of the Court’s death 
penalty cases. In Coker v. Georgia,14 the Court stated that a 
death sentence is excessive and unconstitutional if either 
of two conditions is met: (a) the sentence “makes no mea-
surable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment 
and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and need-
less imposition of pain and suffering” or (b) the sentence 
is “grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.” 
The second condition seemed to imply a retributive stan-
dard, because proportionality has been most commonly 
associated with that punishment theory;15 moreover, the 
Court invalidated Coker’s sentence entirely on that 
ground—that is, on the basis of the lesser harm of his 
nonhomicide offense—ignoring case facts that might have 
supported a death sentence to deter other violent offend-
ers.16 Subsequent cases barring use of the death penalty 
have been based on both prongs of the Coker standard, but 
the Court’s most recent case, Kennedy v. Louisiana, extends 
Coker and quotes the Coker standards, including the lan-
guage that each prong is independent.17
As noted, the majority in Graham also discusses the 
other Coker prong—whether the punishment serves legiti-
mate penological goals other than retribution. But the 
good news here is that, in rejecting these sentencing pur-
poses as sufficient justifications for Graham’s LWOP 
sentence, Justice Kennedy’s opinion may shed some light 
on a question the Court has studiously ignored in previous 
decisions: What makes a sentence grossly disproportion-
ate relative to these nonretributive purposes? In previous 
writings,18 I have proposed two nonretributive proportion-
ality principles and have shown how they have been 
applied in a wide variety of constitutional contexts.
The first principle, what I call ends-benefits propor-
tionality, requires that the costs and burdens of 
punishment should not exceed the likely benefits to be 
achieved; furthermore, the added costs and burdens of a 
more severe penalty compared with a lesser one should 
not exceed the likely added benefits. The second principle, 
alternative-means proportionality (referred to by some 
writers as the principle of parsimony or necessity, and 
akin to constitutional requirements of narrow tailoring), 
posits that, because punishment is itself an evil (it is 
harmful to offenders, and costly), a penalty should be the 
least severe measure that will suffice under the circum-
stances—in other words, if a less severe punishment will 
achieve essentially the same benefits, the more severe pen-
alty is excessive. 
Each of these two utilitarian proportionality principles 
finds some support in Justice Kennedy’s opinion. Ends-
benefits proportionality is implicit in his rejection of 
deterrence as a sufficient rationale for Graham’s LWOP 
sentence; Justice Kennedy argues that the same factors of 
immaturity, underdeveloped sense of responsibility, and 
susceptibility to peer pressure that make juveniles less 
morally culpable also make them less deterable; thus, “any 
limited deterrent effect provided by life without parole [or 
any added effect compared to life with parole?] is not 
enough to justify the sentence.”19
The other utilitarian principle, alternate-means propor-
tionality, is implicit in Justice Kennedy’s rejection of 
incapacitation and rehabilitation as justifications for Gra-
ham’s sentence. Because juveniles have a greater capacity 
for change than adults, a sentencing court cannot know 
whether, at some time before he dies, this particular juve-
nile will become much less dangerous due to maturation, 
religious conversion, and/or rehabilitation. An LWOP  
sentence represents an irrevocable judgment of perma-
nent incorrigibility, and is thus constitutionally excessive 
because it may prove unnecessarily severe.20 One impor-
tant broader implication of this argument is that mandatory 
minimum sentences likewise cannot be justified on inca-
pacitation grounds—inevitably, some of the offenders who 
fall within the scope of the mandatory minimum will be, 
or become, insufficiently dangerous to justify the fixed 
minimum term.21
ii. The Bad News
Despite the hopeful signs highlighted previously, there is 
reason to doubt that Graham will have many, or even any, 
of these broader and beneficial effects. Moreover, the jus-
tices have once again missed an opportunity to more 
clearly define Eighth Amendment standards; indeed, Jus-
tice Kennedy’s opinion may have made those standards 
even more opaque.
a. Kennedy’s Majority Opinion—Less Than Meets 
the eye?
The scope of Justice Kennedy’s opinion is potentially very 
narrow (and Justice Roberts’s opinion is even narrower). 
The factors that encouraged Justice Kennedy to overcome 
the death-is-different barrier are, themselves, fairly unique 
and different from most other cases challenging a prison 
term on Eighth Amendment grounds—Graham was a 
juvenile offender, receiving an LWOP sentence, for a non-
homicide crime. The majority stressed all three of these 
differences. In lieu of the death-is-different distinction, 
Justice Kennedy seemingly drew a new dividing line, cit-
ing Solem v. Helm for the proposition that, among prison 
sentences, LWOP is qualitatively different from life with 
parole, especially for a juvenile.22 In a future prison- 
sentence case, if any of these three factors is lacking, the 
Court can easily say—“Graham was different.”
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and freakish as some death penalties the Court has  
invalidated.27
Still, how will lower courts know whether and when  
to use the categoric approach, in cases seeking to extend 
Graham? And beyond the difference between categoric 
and case-specific rulings, how much do the death penalty 
and Solem-Harmelin-Ewing standards differ? The latter 
requires the reviewing court to first find an inference of 
gross disproportionality (based on a threshold compari-
son of the defendant’s sentence with his crimes—Solem, 
step one), before the court may engage in intra- and inter-
jurisdictional comparisons (steps two and three), whereas 
the categoric death penalty approach seems to proceed 
in the opposite order: The Court first conducts an inter-
jurisdictional comparison (Solem, step three), looking 
for evidence of a national consensus against the type of  
sentence at issue. The Court then essentially conducts  
a Solem step-one analysis, making its own independent 
disproportionality assessment by comparing the severity 
of the penalty with the defendant’s culpability and the 
harmfulness of the offense, in light of precedent and  
the Eighth Amendment’s “text, history, meaning, and 
purpose.”28 
Thus, the main effect of using the national-consensus-
plus-independent-judgment approach is to guarantee 
interjurisdictional comparisons in every case by eliminating 
the Solem-Harmelin-Ewing step-one threshold require ment 
(while also eliminating Solem step two—intrajurisdictional 
comparisons). But are lower courts bound to take this 
approach? Or can a court that wants to uphold a severe 
prison sentence simply choose to rule on a case-specific 
basis and apply the much stricter Solem-Harmelin-Ewing 
standards?
2. Utilitarian disproportionality Standards As noted 
previously, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion implies that 
a sentence based on nonretributive (crime-control) punish-
ment purposes can also be grossly disproportionate. But 
neither his opinion nor the Roberts concurrence defines 
any standards of utilitarian proportionality, although at least 
two such principles may underlie Kennedy’s rejection of 
crime-control justifications for Graham’s LWOP sentence.
Kennedy also says very little about how the applicable 
proportionality standards relate to each other, but he implies 
that they are not independent, and that a sentence must be 
grossly disproportionate to all applicable purposes—“A 
sentence lacking any legitimate penological justification is 
by its nature disproportionate to the offense.”29 As I have 
argued in previous writings, each of the three proportion-
ality principles (one retributive and two nonretributive) 
reflects distinct and important values, so a violation of any 
one of them should suffice to make a sentence unconstitu-
tionally excessive.30 
At a minimum, the Court should have made explicit 
what is only implicit in Graham: that the two nonretribu-
tive proportionality principles are independent of each 
other, so that a violation of either principle can invalidate  
Moreover, the actual holding of Kennedy’s opinion 
does not necessarily prevent this or other defendants from 
spending the rest of their lives in prison. The opinion 
emphasizes that it does not guarantee a right to actual 
release, only a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release 
based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”23 So 
despite the extended discussion by Justice Kennedy (and 
Justice Roberts) of the diminished culpability of juvenile 
nonhomicide offenders, it appears that they can end up 
serving life without parole unless, at some point, crime-
control purposes justify release—their diminished 
culpability and other retributive values based on the origi-
nal offense impose no upper limit on prison time served.
B. eighth amendment Standards May have Become 
even More Unclear
Justice Kennedy’s extension of death penalty standards to 
some prison sentences raises many new problems. More-
over, it remains unclear how the underlying standard of 
gross disproportionality is defined, especially in relation 
to nonretributive punishment purposes such as deter-
rence and incapacitation. 
1. death Penalty Standards Versus Solem Standards  
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion applies standards pre-
viously used only in death penalty cases, rather than the 
standards of Solem v. Helm, as modified in the Harmelin 
and Ewing plurality opinions. But when are courts required 
to use the majority’s approach, and how much does this 
approach actually differ in substance and likely results 
from the Solem standards?
Justice Kennedy initially seems to choose the categoric, 
death penalty approach because that’s what Graham’s 
counsel asked the Court to do.24 But as Justice Roberts 
points out, Graham also asked, in the alternative, for a rul-
ing using the Solem standards, and surely the majority 
could have chosen that approach if it wanted to. (More-
over, not all of the death penalty cases cited by the majority 
were fully categoric; Enmund v. Florida25 was arguably 
based on the specific facts of the defendant’s limited 
accomplice role and intent.) However, there were good 
reasons to adopt a broader, categoric rule in a case like 
Graham. Justice Kennedy noted one of those reasons later 
in his opinion: Any case involving a juvenile offender 
raises greater risks of unwise defendant litigation choices 
and poor communication with counsel, leading to overall 
defense ineffectiveness and an unacceptable risk that 
some of these offenders will receive an unconstitutionally 
severe sentence.26 
Other familiar arguments in favor of a broad, bright-
line ruling are that it gives lower courts more guidance 
and protects reviewing courts from a flood of new sentenc-
ing appeals. It also lessens gross sentencing disparities. 
Under a case-specific ruling (or the hands-off approach of 
the dissent), juvenile nonhomicide LWOP sentences 
would remain very rare in practice; such highly selective 
severity would make the penalty as capricious, wanton, 
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a proposed nonretributive punishment rationale. Finally, 
the Court should avoid using imprecise language that con-
fuses very different sentencing purposes—for example, 
when it says that, for reasons of incapacitation, Graham 
“deserved” some period of incarceration, and that he 
might eventually prove so irredeemable and permanently 
dangerous as to “deserve” LWOP.31 Deserved punishment 
is the language of retribution, not incapacitation.
iii. conclusion
Graham is both good news and bad news for those seeking 
meaningful and clear Eighth Amendment limits on exces-
sive prison sentences. Juvenile nonhomicide offenders 
will certainly benefit from taking LWOP off the table, but 
it remains to be seen how many of those offenders will 
actually serve less than their full lives in prison. Moreover, 
in cases not governed by the majority’s categoric rule (e.g., 
a juvenile nonhomicide offender with a fifty-year minimum 
sentence), will the Court and lower courts expand Graham 
and its novel, death-isn’t-so-different approach? Alterna-
tively, will they limit Graham to its facts—or go in multiple, 
inconsistent directions? Doctrinally, will the Court more 
clearly define its standards of retributive and nonretributive 
proportionality, building on the implicit standards applied 
in Graham? Or, will it continue to speak loosely, and con-
fusingly, about proportionality and deserved punishment? 
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